MOGADISHU — The National Constituent Assembly approved on 1 August the new Somali Provisional Constitution, which will be used until a national referendum is possible to approve it and make it a more permanent constitution.
The assembly is a cross section of the Somali clans selected by the clan elders, and hence promised an accord between different political players about the constitution-writing process.
However, the new constitution comes amid concerns about the volatility of the Transitional Federal Government, whose Islamist component remains in deep opposition to the secularists in power, and whose loyalties might fall elsewhere.
The new constitution
The new provisional constitution states in the first article that “Somalia is a federal, sovereign and democratic republic founded on inclusive representation of the people and a multiparty system and social justice.”
Whereas this is encouraging to secular Somalis, the provisional constitution shows a heavy Islamist influence in its founding principles, irking some secular Somali politicians.
For instance, the third article states: “The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia is based on the foundations of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of our Prophet Mohamed and protects the higher objectives of Sharia and social justice.”
It goes on to state in the first paragraph of the fourth article that Sharia is above the constitution: “After the Sharia, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia is the supreme law of the country. It binds the government and guides policy initiatives and decisions in all departments of government.”
While Sharia is wildly popular in Somalia, with the outgoing parliament unanimously voting to make Sharia the law of the land in 2009, some feel it is an attempt by the Islamist factions in the transitional government to impose their views on the rest of the nation.
A secular MP in the outgoing parliament who did not want to be named for security reasons spoke about his concerns regarding the Islamists’ rising powers.
“These Islamists have rooted themselves in Somali politics for good by basing the whole constitution on Sharia. They may one day outlaw secular parties, claiming that they are unconstitutional,” the MP said.
The Islamists of the transitional government
The Islamists in the government can ideologically be classified into two main groups: the Salafis and the Sufis, who normally use the term Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a to refer to themselves.
Most of the Salafis in government had been fighting in and around Mogadishu since 2005 and were united under the Islamic Courts Union.
When Sheikh Sharif — who used to lead the Islamic Courts, which battled the Ethiopians to regain power after Ethiopia invaded Somalia in late 2006 — was elected president in January 2009, most of the armed Salafis joined the government. Their leaders became ministers and MPs in the transitional government, and their armed units were nominally integrated into the army, police and intelligence services.
Sufis joined the Somali Civil War initially as an independent clan militia based in central Somalia that was opposed to Al-Shabab, the most extreme of Somalia’s Islamist insurgents, in late 2008.
They later became more or less an Ethiopian proxy, with the Ethiopians encouraging the formation of more such ASWJ groups in other parts of Somalia. Most of these groups are considered mere clan militias; the religious veneer is used to gain some support in Somalia’s increasingly conservative society.
In Mogadishu, the local ASWJ claims to number in the hundreds and has fighting units that are nominally part of the Somali national army but, like their Salafi counterparts, have more loyalty to their sheikhs than the national government.
Given their rising power, the ASWJ was also given ministerial positions in the transitional government but are not as represented in the security services as the Salafis, who have considerable power in almost every security department.
The Salafis in government security services consider themselves mujahideen who are fighting to defend an Islamic government against what they consider to be a heretic Khariji sect, Al-Shabab. For them, Al-Shabab members are Khawarij because they failed to listen to the older Salafi sheikhs who called on it to take the path of peace and also because they allow the killing of their fellow Muslims.
Ahmed Daaci, the district commissioner of Wadajir in Mogadishu, blames former Al-Shabab and current transitional government security officials for the insecurity in the country.
“They join the government forces with the intent of destabilizing [the government] from within,” he said.
Contested relations with Al-Shabab
The ideology of the mujahideen in the United Nations-sponsored transitional government security forces can be best illustrated by the views of three Islamists in the government: Ali Suleiman, a mid-level commander in the National Security Service Agency, the internal spy agency; Hassan Mahad, a captain in the police; and Yusuf, a former commander in the now-defunct Islamist insurgent group, Jabhal Islamiya.
Suleiman strongly believes that Al-Shabab’s members are heretics and that by fighting them he is doing a religious duty; he believes he will go to paradise if killed fighting Al-Shabab.
“For me, this is jihad. [Al-Shabab] would spill my blood if they got the chance. They threatened to kill me if I hadn’t defected to them when Sharif became president. I am fighting to defend my life and the lives of fellow Muslims,” Suleiman said.
One of the first Islamic Courts commanders assassinated by Al-Shabab in early 2009 was the immediate commander of Suleiman, who then had been in the leadership council of an Islamic Courts Union unit of about 200 fighters.
The killing of his commander forced him to decide not to join Al-Shabab, bringing into question his loyalty to the government and his conviction in its cause, as he only joined to seek revenge from the extremist group. He still calls the secular elements of the government “alool uus” — a derogatory phrase meaning “stomach full of shit” — as the transitional government was known to the insurgency.
Mahad, the Islamist policeman, made it clear he does not have any issues with Al-Shabab, except the fact that it failed to listen to the elder Salafi scholars, and because it doesn’t “pay well.” He agrees with Al-Shabab that the Sufis are “grave worshippers,” and considers the African Union Mission in Somalia — forces protecting the government — to be an undesirable means to an end.
He shares Ali’s hatred for non-Islamist government members.
Once, as he was driving around Mogadishu with jihadi songs blaring from his stereo, a transitional government soldier waved for a ride. Mahad continued driving and ridiculed the young soldier: “Look at that alool uus — what would make him think that I would give him a ride?”
The source from Al-Shabab said Suleiman is perceived as an apostate by even some of his family members. Despite his religious zeal, he is very involved in the anti-Al-Shabab operations inside the city, because he takes the war with Al-Shabab personally following the killing of his commander, the source said.
Mahad, meanwhile, is almost admired by Al-Shabab, and not only because he might be secretly working with them. He seems to be “honorable,” not harassing potential Al-Shabab sympathizers or members in Mogadishu, but fighting them at the front lines.
Moreover, the source said Mahad is also involved in the sale of police pistols to Al-Shabab, for whom these arms are increasingly important as they change their tactics in the capital to concentrate more on assassination of soft government targets.
Yusuf, the former Jabhal Islamiya official, is different from both these men. He was a senior commander well-known to now-senior Al-Shabab officials.
His joining of the government surprised many because he was not only a commander, but also a jihadist scholar that practically made many current Al-Shabab members.
He is not considered an apostate by some Al-Shabab officials, instead opting to label him a murji’ — a member of a heretic sect that is the complete opposite of the Khawarij. They believe no action will make anyone an apostate, unlike the Khawarij, who consider even minor sins worthy of nullifying one’s faith.
One of Yusuf’s former comrades in the insurgency, now an Al-Shabab official, said he sometimes calls his old friend to try to “turn” him, but it isn’t working because the friend strongly believes that he is fighting a jihad, from the other side.
“I asked him to tell me what has changed and who had changed: us or him? I told him that I was still on the path, but that he had diverted. But he would just argue nonsense,” asserts the bewildered Al-Shabab official.
Whether the mujahideen in the government are still loyal to a government that is led by an “alool uus” is everyone’s concern in Somalia. The Provisional Constitution has strong Islamist tones, but only time will tell whether that will be enough to keep them loyal to the government.
