International news agency coverage preceding Arab channels and websites indicate that the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime occurred during an offensive by armed opposition groups—i.e., multiple armed opposition factions—led by Ahmad al-Sharaa.
This offensive concluded on December 8, 2024—exactly one year ago—with these forces seizing control of Damascus and forcing the former president to flee to Russia, where he was granted humanitarian political asylum by a Kremlin decision.
In the single year since the regime’s collapse, a Sunni-Islamist rooted transitional authority has formed in Syria.
This authority seeks to consolidate its legitimacy domestically through promises of reconstruction and reconciliation, and externally through openness—mediated by Turkey—to the US and Gulf nations, lifting sanctions, and reintegrating Syria into regional and international systems.
However, this transformation had impacts extending beyond Syria and the region. It practically ended the model of the Russian and Iranian allied state that characterized the pre-2024 era, opening a new phase that can be headlined as: “How will Moscow adapt to post-Assad Syria?”
Answering this question requires us to present an objective analysis, far removed from emotions and reactions, regarding Russia’s situation after the change in authority—that is, after losing its ally.
This is a matter of no dispute among objective observers.
What is Moscow, the Kremlin, and Putin adopting to try and secure their cards?
Following the fall of Assad’s Damascus, Moscow officially announced its acceptance of Assad’s “resignation” and granted him political asylum for humanitarian purposes—a detail that carries weight under international law.
Thus, the presence of the refugee Assad in Russia is now a new aspect of relations with the Syrian Transitional Government.
This creates a surreal situation: on the one hand, the opposition-turned-ruling faction is attempting to use Assad’s prosecution as a bargaining chip with Russia; on the other hand, the Kremlin retains this card as a potential tool of influence over former Alawite and loyalist communities within Syria.
This symbolic and political presence of Assad and his security and financial circle (a significant part of the former inner circle now operates from Moscow, according to journalistic investigations) undoubtedly makes Russia an inseparable party in the issue of transitional justice in the new Syria.
Regarding the Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, their status suffered a serious shock after the fall of the previous regime. Here, I rely on open-source reports that spoke of a wide naval withdrawal from Tartus at the end of 2024, followed by a decision by the new Syrian government to terminate the old agreement that granted Moscow the right to use the port for 49 years.
Nevertheless, based on current data, we absolutely cannot say that the Russian military presence in Syria has ended.
The reality is that it has not ended; rather, it has entered a re-negotiation phase.
Intersecting Russian and Western sources indicate that Russia has maintained a presence at Hmeimim and a degree of usage of Tartus, with negotiations ongoing regarding the legal and political terms of this presence.
As an objective observer, I must note that this occurs amid Moscow, the Kremlin, and Putin’s intense need for a point of leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean, as quickly compensating for this loss in Libya or the Red Sea is impossible, or at least difficult, despite The Wall Street Journal’s leaks about Russian negotiations with Sudan on this matter.
In subsequent interviews and statements – including those made during his first visit to Moscow where Putin received him in the most important halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace, Ahmad al-Sharaa—in my opinion, shrewdly and wisely—keenly reassured Moscow that previous agreements “will not be entirely discarded,” and that the new Syria is “redefining” (this is a direct quote from Sharaa) its relationship with Russia, not severing it.
However, he also objectively demanded that Russia review its role during the war and compensate the victims.
What are Russia’s interests in post-Assad Syria?
The reality is that Russia has diverse interests in the new Syria.
However, I first want to affirm a conceptual correction related to the new Russia—the Russia post-Soviet Union—so that people understand the motives behind Putin’s Russian actions.
This is an important conceptual truth for anyone who wishes to understand Russia’s foreign policy: This policy is built upon a realist perspective in international relations and is governed by pragmatism in its neutral, objective, and positive sense.
By this, I mean that it builds its relationships with states based on who is in power and controls the state, regardless of how they attained it. The most important consideration in all of this is mutual interests with the least amount of intervention in internal affairs.
Therefore, Russia has numerous strategic military interests in the new Syria.
The first interest, in my opinion, lies in maintaining the capability for naval and air projection in the Eastern Mediterranean via Tartus and Hmeimim, as they represent the only extension outside the former Soviet space.
Losing these two bases or fundamentally restricting them would weaken Russia’s ability to maneuver Ukraine, the the Black Sea, and the Middle East simultaneously. Therefore, a minimum level of military presence on the Syrian coast becomes a structural priority for Russian policy.
No less important is the security interest, although it comes second in my view; countering jihadists is one of Russia’s security priorities.
The rise of a transitional leadership with a jihadist background—and here I mean Ahmad al-Sharaa, who comes from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—raises security concerns in Moscow related to the possibility of Syria transforming into a new platform for attracting Caucasian and Central Asian fighters.
This conclusion is not unfounded; rather, it is derived from my personal monitoring of both official and analytical levels concerning this matter.
Hence, Russia seeks to maintain security working channels with the new Damascus to ensure its participation in counter-terrorism arrangements and prevent the formation of safe havens for armed opponents of Moscow.
Economic and energy interests also have a presence.
The continuation of contracts for energy, phosphates, and ports that were concluded during the Assad era—even if renegotiated regarding profit percentages or concession duration—is important for Russian companies. These contracts provide Russian companies operating in the fields of oil, gas, phosphates, and port management with a significant outlet in the Eastern Mediterranean economy.
Russian companies are also interested in securing their share in reconstruction projects, especially given estimates that speak of hundreds of billions of dollars required to rebuild Syria. Therefore, Russian companies—despite sanctions and the war in Ukraine—seek to ensure a foothold in housing, energy, and infrastructure projects, even if their presence is less pronounced than that of Turkish, Western, and Gulf entities.
Furthermore, managing Syria’s debts to Russia remains a critical issue – Russia’s share of Syria’s external debt is around 15 percent.
This topic is however no longer a priority for cash collection—in my opinion—as much as it is a negotiating tool to link any additional write-off, restructuring, or rescheduling to investment and political guarantees from the new authority.
Based on everything presented above, I can offer my own description of the nature of the Russian-Syrian relationship after the change: in my opinion, it has transformed from a totalitarian alliance to a conditional partnership.
This means the relationship, previously based on a near-absolute alliance with the Assad regime, has now shifted post-2024 to a partnership governed by specific conditions with a transitional authority that seeks to diversify its allies—a fact that Moscow understands and that the Kremlin is well aware of.
New Damascus needs Russia as an important partner, not an exclusive one
Damascus itself now needs Russia as a strong international actor.
Russia is a permanent member and active player in the UN Security Council, and it can potentially play the role of a guarantor against Israeli, Turkish, and Kurdish challenges. However, Damascus also needs Washington and the Gulf capitals to launch the reconstruction process and end its isolation.
This scenario I present places Russia in the position of an important, but not exclusive, partner, unlike previous years where the Kremlin enjoyed the status of a near-sole provider of international protection and military cover for the regime.
There is another important point I must highlight: the official and media discourse close to the new leadership in Damascus shows a trend towards demanding that Moscow review its role in the previous war, by speaking about the “mistakes of the past,” the “rights of the victims,” as well as raising the issue of prosecuting Assad himself.
Conversely, and as I understand the Russian position on this matter, Moscow prefers to avoid any legal or political precedent that could later be used against its interventions in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Therefore, the temporary outcome here is the postponement of settling the issue of Assad and the prosecution of those responsible for crimes, in exchange for continued limited security, political, and military cooperation, with each party retaining its pressure cards.
In conclusion, post-Assad Syria is no longer an exclusive area of Russian influence, but it has also not become an arena for Moscow’s complete exclusion.
What Russia is attempting to do today is maintain the minimum of its strategic gains—be they bases, security influence, or essential commercial and economic contracts—within a new political environment that does not resemble the regime it defended for a decade.
In Moscow, there is a growing realization that the necessary and desired cost of staying in Syria after 2024 will be politically and economically higher than it was before the fall of Assad.
